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ABSTRACT. Research on collective action and common-pool resources is extensive. However, little work has concentrated on the
effect of variability in resource availability and collective action, especially in the context of asymmetric access to resources. Earlier
works have demonstrated that environmental variability often leads to a reduction of collective action in the governance of shared
resources. Here we assess how environmental variability may impact collective action. We performed a behavioral experiment involving
an irrigation dilemma. In this dilemma participants invested first into a public fund that generated water resources for the group, which
were subsequently appropriated by one participant at a time from head end to tail end. The amount of resource generated for the given
investment level was determined by a payoff table and a stochastic event representing environmental variability, i.e., rainfall. Results
show that that (1) upstream users’ behavior is by far the most important variable in determining the outcome of collective action; (2)
environmental variability (i.e. risk level in investing in the resource) has little effect on individual investment and extraction levels; and
(3) the action-reaction feedback is fundamental in determining the success or failure of communities.
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INTRODUCTION
A challenge in managing common-pool resources, such as water
for irrigation, is how to prevent the free-rider problem, i.e.,
ensuring that the individual users of a resource all contribute to
the allocation and maintenance of the resource and that some
don’t take advantage of the efforts of others. Collective action is
thus especially challenging in systems that are naturally prone to
asymmetries caused by differences in power or geographic
position. Some individuals are privileged in extracting resources,
as seen in irrigation systems. In these systems, asymmetries
because of heterogeneity caused by the biophysical context favor
free riders (Anderies et al. 2011). A key feature in many of these
systems lies in the coupled interactions between the natural
processes of the environment and the decisions of the resource
users (Anderies et al. 2004). Global environmental change is
increasing the level of variability and is therefore increasing risk
and uncertainty for natural resource users. In this context,
studying the effect of environmental variability on collective
action is critical to assessing the sustainability of coupled social-
ecological systems. Anderies and Janssen (2011) argue that the
increase of environmental variability may reduce the ability of
resource users to solve collective action problems. To improve our
understanding of the interactions between users’ decisions about
exploiting a resource and variability in the availability of that
resource, we performed a simple behavioral experiment.  
The experiment focused on irrigation dilemmas, which explore
the challenges of asymmetric access to a common resource shared
between downstream and upstream users. To resolve the dilemma,
upstream participants need to allow water to flow to downstream
participants. This is because upstream participants need the
cooperation of downstream participants to create the public
infrastructure (e.g., irrigation canals) for the irrigation system
(Ostrom and Gardner 1993). The irrigation dilemma we propose
in this paper has been studied in lab and field experiments (Janssen
et al. 2011, 2012, Cardenas et al. 2013). These previous
experiments found that (1) participants’ initial level of
cooperation relates to their trust in the other participants and (2)
inequality in the resource extractions can reduce investments into
the public infrastructure. Because irrigation systems are
developed to cope with variability of rainfall availability, it is a
natural extension to study the effect of variability in water
provisioning.  
Common resource dilemma experiments within social psychology
have studied the consequences of environmental variability (e.g.,
Messick et al. 1988, Rapaport et al. 1992, Biel and Gärling 1995,
Wit and Wilke 1998, Au 2004). However, in contrast to the
experiments described in this paper, those studies were one-shot
games in which environmental variability was related to the size
of the resource. In these previous studies, variability increased
overharvesting because people overestimated the size of the
resource and therefore thought noncooperative behavior was
justified (Biel and Gärling 1995). Using this approach, Budescu
et al. (1990) performed experiments that introduced asymmetry
in payoff rules, in contrast to the asymmetrical access to the
resource that we used in our experiment, and found that different
positions led to different responses to environmental variability.
Individuals with more favorable exchange rates for resource units
to earnings reduced their demands for the common resource
compared with those who had less favorable exchange rates.
Walker and Gardner (1992) introduced environmental variability
in a repeated commons dilemma by assuming that more
harvesting leads to a higher probability that the current round is
the last round of the experiment. In their experiment,
environmental variability led to a greater appropriation of the
resource. Anderies et al. (2013) studied the effect of disturbances
in a computer-based lab experiment on the irrigation dilemma
where participants could communicate. They found a very modest
negative effect of variability in water availability and
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infrastructure decline. However, because participants could
communicate in that design, that might have buffered some of the
effect of environmental variability.  
Based on these studies, we would expect increased variability to
lead to reduced cooperation and that other important social
metrics, like risk aversion, trust, and upstream users’ behavior,
would contribute to the observed levels of investment and
extraction. We expected that risk-neutral individuals (i.e.,
participants who showed no preference between options with equal
expected payoffs but differing levels of risk) would not take
environmental variability into account in the decision-making
process. We expected trust to be a significant factor in how
participants choose to invest in the public infrastructure, and higher
measures of trust from the Trust Game would correspond with
higher levels of investment in the Irrigation Game. Upstream users’
behavior is also an important, observable metric that accounts for
feedback between different rounds and between the investment and
extraction phases. An individual may “trust” others to invest in the
resource; then, in subsequent rounds, an individual will act based
on the observed behavior of upstream users. The behavior of
upstream users can be inferred by the downstream users through
their collective extraction level, which we model using an equal-
share ratio (ESR) metric. In our analysis of the effects of upstream
users’ behavior, we relied on the ESR and net gains, an heuristic
found in many social dilemmas such as ultimatum games (Allison
and Messick 1990).  
The laboratory experiments reported in this paper built on a prior
experimental design in which the participants could not
communicate (Janssen et al. 2012). However, in addition to having
an asymmetric common-pool resource dilemma without
communication, we introduced different levels of investment risk
in the form of environmental variability within the experiment.
These new variables allowed us to determine if  and how different
levels of environmental variability affect the level of cooperation,
measured as investment into the public infrastructure. Variability
seems to decrease the willingness of people to invest in the resource,
at least in public good games (see, e.g., Wit and Wilke 1998,
Gustafson et al. 2000, Au 2004). However, variability in resource
generation in repeated common-pool resources experiments has
not been sufficiently studied (but see Anderies et al. 2013 and
Walker and Gardner 1992). This is an important extension because
climatic change and other global environmental changes affect the
variability of the resources that users may depend on; thus, it can
potentially have an impact on resource users’ behavior.  
Our main aim was to assess which factors are most important in
influencing collective action at different levels of environmental
variability in social-ecological systems with asymmetric access to
the common-pool resource. Is environmental variability a decisive
factor in assessing investment in common-pool resources, or is it
dampened by the observed upstream behavior?  
The asymmetric access to the resource, resulting from the sequential
extraction decision, leads to unequal resource distribution and
unequal earnings. Thus, strategic uncertainty, i.e., regarding
investment and extraction choices of others, and observed
upstream users’ behavior outweigh environmental variability and
initial trust levels. The latter finding is in line with Ostrom’s claims
about the importance of feedback effects between trust and actions
based on the observed behavior of others (Ostrom 1998). We were
able to assess the latter by implementing a statistical analysis that
addressed feedbacks between investment and extraction
decisions, taking time into account. Variability affected the level
of investment in the resource, thus, the level of collective action,
but it had a milder effect compared with upstream behavior and
social determinants of behavior. The effect of environmental
variability on investment and extraction levels was only observed
in specific sequences, i.e., sequences 2 and 3 in Table 1.
Table 1. Treatment designs.
 
Short-
Name
# of
groups
Treatment
Period 1
Rounds 1-5
Treatment
Period 2
Rounds 6-10
Treatment
Period 3
Rounds
11-15
Sequence 1 NLH 6 No
Variability
Low
Variability
High
Variability
Sequence 2 NHL 5 No
Variability
High
Variability
Low
Variability
Sequence 3 LHN 5 Low
Variability
High
Variability
No
Variability
LHN, low, high, and no variability;
NHL, no, high, and low variability;
NLH, no, low, and high variability.
EXPERIMENT DESIGN
Each experimental session started with individuals being assigned
randomly to a seat in the lab. After seat assignments, we
implemented the Holt and Laury (2002) risk elicitation exercise
(see Appendix 1) and trust using the Trust Game from Berg et al.
(1995); see Appendix 1 for details. The Trust Game used the
strategy method of each participant submitting decisions as both
the proposer and respondent. The order of the exercises was kept
fixed as follows: Risk Elicitation (Aversion), Trust Game, and
Irrigation Game. During the Trust Game, participants were made
aware that they would be randomly paired with any other
participant in the room to assess their performance. When we
started the Irrigation Game, we explained that each individual
would interact only with the same four other individuals for the
duration of the experiment. Pairing was anonymous, and scores
stemming from the trust and risk games were calculated only after
the Irrigation Game was over, although those games were played
before the Irrigation Game. Once all exercises were completed,
we collected additional sociodemographic information via an
individual survey (reported in Appendix 1).  
The main experiment performed was a five-person irrigation
game (see Appendix 1 for the detailed instructions given to each
participant regarding the experiment). These five participants
were randomly allocated to positions A, B, C, D, and E, with A
being the furthest upstream participant and E being the furthest
downstream participant. The participants kept the same position
during the duration of the whole experiment. The experiment
mimicked the provision of infrastructure and the distribution of
water that small-scale irrigation systems require (Cifdaloz et al.
2010, Janssen et al. 2012). Figure 1 provides a graphical
representation of the investment and extraction stages of our
Irrigation Game. Appendix 1 provides the exact experimental
protocol.
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Fig. 1. Flow chart of one irrigation experiment round.
At the beginning of each round, each participant received an
endowment of ten tokens, which they could invest into the
irrigation infrastructure or keep for themselves. Each token was
worth five cents. The total investment of the five participants
defined the state of the irrigation system. Table 2 shows the
amount of water that could flow through the irrigation system
based on the total investment.
Table 2. Water production as a function of units invested in the
public infrastructure. The table includes a default production
function (medium), as well as a production function during a dry
round (low) and an affluent round (high).
 
Total units invested
by all players
Water available
(low)
Water
available
(medium)
Water
available
(high)
0-10 0 0 0
11-15 2 5 8
16-20 8 20 32
21-25 16 40 64
26-30 24 60 96
31-35 30 75 120
36-40 34 85 136
41-45 38 95 152
46-50 40 100 160
In the second half  of the round, each participant in sequential
turns from upstream to downstream (from the player in position
A to the player in position E) decided how much water to extract
from the available water. Available water was the total water
produced by the group minus the water already extracted by the
upstream participants. For example, water available for a player
in position C was equal to the total water generated minus the
water extracted by the player in position A and the player in
position B. Each individual knew how much water was at his or
her disposal and was told at the beginning of each extraction
phase how much water was available to the whole group. Knowing
the total water availability before the extraction phase allowed
each player to infer how much the whole group has invested in
the resource. Knowing the total water availability before the
extraction phase also allowed group members to know how much
was extracted by upstream users. For example, player B could
infer how much player A extracted (the amount of water available
for the group minus the amount of water available for player B),
player C could easily infer the total amount of water extracted by
players A and B combined, and so on.  
Each token kept in the investment stage added to each token
extracted in the extraction stage of each round. The number of
tokens kept and tokens extracted over all 15 rounds were then
calculated to determine the payment made to each participant.
The average total payout was $22.83 (standard deviation = $6.20).
The average total payout represented average payment based on
performance in the Irrigation Game, the earnings from the trust
and risk aversion exercises, and a show-up fee of $5. Each session
lasted for about 1 hour.  
Each session consisted of 1 practice round to demonstrate the
game’s procedures and 15 decision rounds played for money, split
into three 5-round treatment periods. Players were not informed
of the actual length of the experiment to avoid the “final round”
effect. Each of the 3 periods applied different levels of
environmental variability. We distinguished between low,
medium, and high rainfall rounds, representing dry, standard, and
heavy water conditions. The low rainfall condition had 60% less
rainfall than the medium rainfall condition for the same level of
investment, and the high rainfall condition had 60% more rainfall
than the medium condition. We also distinguished between 3
levels of environmental variability:  
1. No variability (no investment risk). Rainfall level was fixed
at the medium level as in Table 2. 
2. Low variability (low investment risk). Randomly
determined use of the low (1/6 probability), medium (2/3
probability), or high (1/6 probability) columns in Table 2 to
elicit water availability. 
3.  High variability (high investment risk). Randomly
determined 1/3 probability for each of the three possible
columns in Table 2 to elicit water availability. 
We defined three treatments with different sequences of the type
of variability in the experiment session (Table 1). The different
sequences were chosen to test the effect of different levels of
variability while controlling for possible learning effects. We were
aware that many more sequences could be designed; however,
having a comprehensive experiment in which all possible sequence
combinations are tested was not feasible given cost constraints
and the availability of test subjects. Individuals could not
participate more than once in the same experiment, even in
different sessions with different variability sequences. Investment
levels in the baseline sequence (no, low, and high variability
[NLH]) were significantly different from levels in the other
sequences assessed (low, high, and no variability [LHN] and no,
high, and low variability [NHL]); however, LHN and NHL did
not display any statistically significant difference.  
According to Rational Choice Theory, the expected behavior for
all players was to invest zero tokens each round. This is because
investing zero tokens is the Nash equilibrium. If  we assume people
act out of rational self-interest, participants in positions B to E
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Table 3. Definition and summary statistics for the variables used in the statistical model. Variables are defined in the main text. For
categorical variables, the percentage of values in a specific category is reported in the mean column jointly with the general mean value.
Avg refers to group averages per round. Gini coefficients were calculated over a specific group and varied at each round.
 
Variable N Mean SD Median Min Max
Investment 1200 5.87 3.46 6.00 0.00 10.00
Avg Investment 1200 5.87 1.98 5.80 0.20 10.00
Extraction 1200 11.83 12.08 10.00 0.00 76.00
Avg Extraction 1200 11.83 7.37 12.00 0.00 32.00
Trust 1200 0.65 0.31 0.67 0.00 1.00
Avg Trust 1200 0.65 0.05 0.63 0.62 0.74
Trustworthiness 1200 0.40 0.16 0.44 0.00 0.67
Avg Trustworthiness 1200 0.40 0.08 0.40 0.18 0.49
Normalized Risk Scores 1200 0.53 0.14 0.50 0.20 0.90
Avg Normalized Risk Scores 1200 0.53 0.02 0.53 0.50 0.55
Equal Share Ratio 1150 1.00 0.95 0.99 0.00 5.00
Net Gain 1200 10.09 11.34 10.00 -10.00 75.00
Extraction Gini Coefficient 1200 0.36 0.24 0.32 0.00 0.80
Investment Gini Coefficient 1200 0.39 0.19 0.25 0.00 0.80
Treatment 1200 0.625 0.484 1.00 0.00 1.00
NLH (%) 450 37.50
NHL or LHN (%) 700 62.50
Variability 1200 1.00 0.82 1.00 0.00 2.00
None (%) 400 33.33
Low (%) 400 33.33
High (%) 400 33.33
Treatment*Variability 1200 2.88 1.67 3.00 0.00 5.00
NLH * No Variability(%) 150 12.50
NLH * Low Variability 150 12.50
NLH * High Variability 150 12.50
NHLorLHN * No Variability 250 20.83
NHLorLHN * Low Variability 250 20.83
NHLorLHN * High Variability 250 20.83
Rainfall 1200 1.04 0.63 1.00 0.00 2.00
Low (%) 215 17.92
Medium (%) 720 60.00
High (%) 265 22.08
Position 1200 3.00 1.41 3.00 1.00 5.00
A (%) 240 20.00
B (%) 240 20.00
C (%) 240 20.00
D (%) 240 20.00
E (%) 240 20.00
LHN, low, high, and no variability;
NHL, no, high, and low variability;
NLH, no, low, and high variability.
would expect player A to take all the water and therefore would
not invest. Because a single person investing in the common
infrastructure would not increase the amount of water available
in the second stage, participant A also would not invest. Therefore,
the Nash equilibrium would always be zero investment,
independent of the level of variability, and thus zero extractions
because no water was generated. However, people do not generally
act solely out of rational self-interest. Instead, especially in
repeated games, they are observed to act based on other
preferences, such as trust and observable group behavior (Ostrom
1998).
DATA DESCRIPTION
Data used in this analysis were derived from six sessions of
experiments performed during the spring of 2012 with
undergraduate students at Arizona State University. The data set
consists of 16 groups of 5 individuals who recorded their decisions
for 15 rounds, resulting in 1200 observations. Summary statistics
for the variables used are reported in Table 3.  
Investment refers to the amount invested in the public
infrastructure, generating the common water resource.
Investment is, for all intents and purposes, a proxy for collective
action (Beckenkamp et al. 2007, Janssen et al. 2011) and is our
main variable of interest, i.e., the dependent variable. Extraction
refers to the amount extracted once water was generated. Trust
and trustworthiness were measured by normalized scores
representing the amount of money sent to another participant
(trust) or sent back (trustworthiness) in the Trust Game (see
Appendix 1 for details); the higher the score, the more trusting
and/or trustworthy an individual is. Both trust and
trustworthiness were normalized by dividing the actual money
sent or sent back by the maximum amount that it was possible to
Ecology and Society 20(4): 12
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol20/iss4/art12/
send or send back. Trust and trustworthiness are deemed to be
important determinants for collective action (Ostrom 1998). Risk
score was the normalized score of the number of low-risk choices
in the Risk Aversion Game; thus, the higher the score, the more
risk averse an individual was (see Appendix 1 for details). Risk
scores were normalized by counting the number of low-risk
choices divided by the maximum number of low-risk choices
available. Normalized risk scores are considered inversely related
to cooperation if  others’ behavior is unknown a priori. Variability
refers to high, low, or no variability in water generation. In other
words, variability refers to the probability of using the left, the
middle, or the right column of Table 2. Sequence refers to the
different order in which variability levels were communicated to
the participants. For example, in sequence NLH, the first five
rounds were played with no variability, the next five rounds were
played with low variability, and finally five rounds were played
with high variability. In sequence LHN, the first five rounds were
played with low variability, then five rounds with high variability,
and finally five rounds with no variability. Rainfall refers to the
actual amount of water generated in a round. Position refers to
the position in which an individual will extract resources (position
A being the first to make a choice and position E the last).  
***The ESR for person i at round t (ESRi,t) was calculated as the
actual amount extracted by individual i at round t (Ei,t) divided
by the total water available to the group at round t at the beginning
of the extraction phase (Rt) divided by 5 (i.e., the amount to extract
that would allow everyone in the group to extract an equal amount
of the resource at time t): 
(1)
 
If  the ESR was less than 1, individual i extracted less than an
equitable share, whereas an ESR greater than 1 means that an
individual extracted more than an equitable share. An ESR of 1
means that an individual extracted the equitable share. ESR is a
simple heuristic measure of how an individual values equality in
distribution of resources. An ESR less than 1 might decrease
cooperation (i.e., investment) in the subsequent round.  
Net gain represents the net profit and is given by: 
(2)
 
The net gain is thus the participant net profit, calculated by the
amount extracted plus the number of tokens not invested in the
resource.  
To assess the effect of variability sequence on investment and
extraction, we performed an Χ² test. We found that the variability
sequence (see Table 1) affected investment and extraction only in
comparison with the NLH order (p < 0.001). We did not find any
significant difference between treatments LHN and NHL (p >
0.05). Given the Χ² test results, we opted to merge the sequences
not leading to significantly different results and include the new
sequence dummy variable in our models (value 0 if  sequence =
NLH and value 1 if  sequence = LHN or NHL). We interacted
the sequence dummy with environmental variability, and this
allowed us to assess the effect of variability on investment and
extraction levels. Furthermore, we also hypothesized that the
significant difference in variability could be at least partly ascribed
to unobserved effects relating to the composition of participants
in each session. Future work will concentrate on finding the
reason for such differences by analyzing survey data collected
during the experiments.  
Three patterns clearly emerged from investment/extraction
behavior. First, upstream participants invested more than
downstream participants (Fig. 2) and, downstream participants
extracted less than upstream participants (Fig. 3). On average,
within a specific group there was a high level of persistence in the
investment and extraction levels (as shown in Fig. S1 and Fig. S2
in Appendix 1). Third, trust appears to have played a role during
the first round of the experiment (Fig. 4A), where increased trust
led to greater investments in the resource, but this effect seems to
have vanished in subsequent rounds (Fig. 4B). Risk aversion
played an ambiguous role in affecting investment. More risk-
neutral participants (normalized risk scores of 0.4, 0.5, and 0.6)
invested less in the resource. This result can be partially explained
by the distribution of individual choices. Intermediate levels were
by far the most common choice (61 out of 80 participants had a
risk score between 0.4 and 0.6) compared with the extremes (1
person had an extremely high risk score, 1 person had an extremely
low risk score, 7 participants had scores < 0.4, and 12 participants
had scores > 0.6; see Fig. 5). Finally, position has a greater impact
on the levels of investment and, most of all, on how much
individuals extracted from the commonly generated resource (Fig.
6). These preliminary findings seem to indicate the existence of
feedbacks between investment, extractions, upstream users’
behavior, and trust. This feedback is also described extensively,
albeit theoretically, by Ostrom (1998).
DATA ANALYSIS
To assess how environmental variability, personal characteristics,
and upstream users’ behavior impacted investments, we regressed
individual and group investments on a set of independent
Fig. 2. Tokens invested per sequence and variability level. LHN,
low, high, and no variability; NHL, no, high, and low
variability; NLH, no, low, and high variability.
Ecology and Society 20(4): 12
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol20/iss4/art12/
Fig. 3. Tokens extracted as fraction of water availability per
sequence and variability level. LHN, low, high, and no
variability; NHL, no, high, and low variability; NLH, no, low,
and high variability.
Fig. 4. Average tokens invested depending on trust (thin bars
represent standard error).
Fig. 5. Average tokens invested depending on normalized risk
score. Red line = Frequency of participants making specific
choices risk choices (thin bars represent standard error).
Fig. 6. Average tokens invested and extracted depending on
position (thin bars represent standard error).
variables, using a hierarchical model with cluster bootstrapped
standard errors. Equation 3 and equation 4 formally represent the
statistical models devised to assess investment levels. 
(3)
(4)
 
Equation 3 analyzes how individual investment levels (Inv) are
dependent upon environmental characteristics, personal characteristics,
and upstream users’ behavior. Environmental characteristics are
composed of position and sequence-variability interactions and are
represented by the vector DSChar in equation 3. Personal
characteristics are composed of trust, normalized risk scores, and
sex, and are represented by the vector SChar in equation 3.
Upstream users’ behavior was assessed via the ESR (equation 1)
and net gain (equation 2), and is represented by (Uub) in equation
3. Finally, εi,t represents the error term.  
Equation 4 is the model we devised to assess group level investment
(GrInv). In this case, we assumed that group-level investment is
dependent on the interaction between sequence and variability
(DGrChar); average group characteristics (average trust and
normalized risk aversion scores) (GrChar); and the effect from
observed upstream users’ behavior (GrUub) represented by the
extraction gini coefficient at t - 1. εi,t is, once again, the error term.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Tables 4 and 5 report the individual- and group-level results for the
models in equations 3 and 4. To account for initial behavioral effects
from trust and risk aversion being attenuated after the first round
as participants responded to the actions of the other participants,
we modeled the round 1 effects separate from rounds 2-15.  
For the individual-level results (Table 4), trust and risk aversion
significantly affected the investment levels only in round 1. From
round 2 to round 15, the upstream users’ behavior and extraction
inequality took a prominent role in explaining the investment level.
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Table 4. Results for the individual-level hierarchical model with standardized coefficients.
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Round1 Rounds 2-15
Round -0.111** -0.059 -0.104* -0.064
(0.037) (0.041) (0.035) (0.044)
NLH x LowVar 0.034** 0.014* 0.032** 0.015*
(0.126) (0.069) (0.116) (0.070)
NLH x HighVar 0.070 0.029 0.066 0.031
(0.592) (0.411) (0.575) (0.413)
LHNorNHL x NoVar -0.317** -0.163** -0.191*** -0.157** -0.195***
(0.568) (0.454) (0.273) (0.471) (0.293)
LHNorNHL x LowVar -0.061 -0.082+ -0.063 -0.081* -0.064
(1.176) (0.369) (0.468) (0.336) (0.497)
LHNorNHL x HighVar -0.135* -0.151** -0.137* -0.149*
(0.508) (0.477) (0.484) (0.489)
Position B 0.012 -0.046 -0.051 -0.040 -0.050
(0.699) (0.444) (0.738) (0.537) (0.741)
Position C -0.074+ -0.114+ -0.097 -0.110 -0.095
(0.272) (0.591) (0.727) (0.683) (0.738)
Position D -0.096 -0.266*** -0.226* -0.251** -0.225*
(0.654) (0.664) (0.806) (0.709) (0.813)
Position E -0.335** -0.359*** -0.316*** -0.342*** -0.314***
(0.778) (0.553) (0.571) (0.562) (0.572)
Normalized Risk Scores 0.170* -0.022 -0.026 -0.022 -0.028
(1.533) (1.044) (1.333) (1.229) (1.303)
Trust 0.326*** 0.009 0.042 0.017 0.039
(0.333) (0.753) (0.594) (0.710) (0.603)
Sex -0.027 -0.142** -0.154*** -0.141** -0.155***
(0.551) (0.317) (0.249) (0.318) (0.265)
ESR (t-1) 0.144* 0.176**
(0.236) (0.201)
NetGain (t-1) 0.063 -0.049*
(0.016) (0.007)
N 80.000 1120.000 1075.000 1120.000 1075.000
AIC 377.694 5723.548 5430.848 5718.632 5429.021
Note: + = significant at the 90% level, * = significant at the 95% level, ** = significant at the 99% level, and *** = significant at the 99.9% level.
Cluster bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses; group is the cluster variable. Position was compared with position A. Sequence and
Variability were compared with Sequence NLH and No Variability. (t - 1) indicates the use of a lagged variable. LHN, low, high, and no variability;
NHL, no, high, and low variability; NLH, no, low, and high variability.
For the group results, however, the average trust and risk aversion
scores significantly affected investments even after the first round
(Table 5).  
Although it was not possible to assess the full interaction between
extraction and investment decisions using the models in equations
3 and 4, the effect of upstream users’ behavior in determining
subsequent investments is clear. At the individual level, position
and upstream users’ behavior, measured here simply by ESR and
net gain, had a significant effect on the level of investment, which
is also confirmed by the group-level gini coefficient: increased
inequality reduced investments. Net gain seemed to actually lower
investments, and by consequence, extractions. ESR had a positive
and significant effect on investments: the higher the ESR, the
more a person was willing to invest, and consequently extraction
might be higher. These results need to be contextualized within
the experiment, in which some individuals were in privileged
positions although still dependent on others’ contributions and
in which actions of upstream users could be, on average, known
to downstream users.  
In the first round, there was no prior behavior for participants to
respond to. Therefore, during the first round, individual-level
characteristics, e.g., trust and risk aversion, were hypothesized to
be the main drivers influencing investment independently from
other factors such as observed upstream users’ behavior,
confirming results from field experiments (Janssen et al. 2012).
Position has a smaller effect on investment, because only positions
C and E extracted significantly less than position A. On the other
hand, trust significantly increased the investment. The interplay
between trust, investment, and extraction in the first round set in
motion the behavior for the subsequent rounds (see also Tables 6
and 7). After the first round, trust did not appear to have a clear
effect or significance, and positions D and E invested significantly
less and almost always extracted significantly less than position
A. Positions B and C on average invested the same amount (i.e.,
there was no significant difference in investment between
positions B and C; Wald p > 0.1), whereas position E on average
invested a significantly different amount than position D (Wald
p < 0.001). These results hold for all models presented in Table 4.
In other words, whereas the central positions (B and C) seemed
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Table 5. Results for the group-level model with standardized coefficients.
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Round 1 Rounds 2-15
Round -0.213*** -0.211*** -0.212*** -0.193***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
NLH x LowVar -0.015 0.044 0.045 0.044 0.058+
(0.178) (0.162) (0.215) (0.212) (0.188)
NLH x HighVar -0.033 0.111*** 0.112** 0.111** 0.122**
(0.181) (0.197) (0.242) (0.235) (0.224)
LHNorNHL x NoVar -0.638*** -0.186*** -0.211*** -0.195*** -0.274***
(0.225) (0.152) (0.187) (0.184) (0.178)
LHNorNHL x LowVar -0.068 -0.097** -0.118** -0.105** -0.132***
(0.332) (0.155) (0.194) (0.189) (0.165)
LHNorNHL x HighVar -0.134*** -0.161*** -0.144*** -0.225***
(0.164) (0.200) (0.192) (0.188)
Gini Extraction (t
-1
) -0.335*** -0.308*** -0.327***
(0.240) (0.259) (0.265)
avg Trust 0.055 0.089*** 0.097*** 0.031
(2.850) (0.716) (0.816) (0.884)
avg Normalized Risk Scores -0.067 0.398*** 0.392***
(4.844) (2.675) (2.732)
N 80.000 1120.000 1120.000 1120.000 1120.000
AIC 223.393 4164.662 4442.871 4431.514 4336.142
Note: ** = significant at the 99% level; *** = significant at the 99.9% level. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses. Sequence and
Variability are compared with Sequence NLH and No Variability. (t - 1) indicates a lagged variable. LHN, low, high, and no variability; NHL, no,
high, and low variability; NLH, no, low, and high variability; AIC, Akaike information criterion.
to invest on average the same amount, there were differences
within the tail-end positions (D and E).The comparison between
the first round and subsequent rounds appears to reinforce the
importance of the feedback between trust, observable actions,
and collective action, as described by Ostrom (1998).  
Similarly to trust, risk aversion was significant only in the first
round (Table 4). This is another indication of the importance of
personal characteristics in one-shot games and at the beginning
of a “collective action enterprise.” However, the fact that risk
aversion and trust were not significant in subsequent rounds
points to the fact that personal characteristic effects become, at
least statistically, nonsignificant in the face of general group
behavior, i.e., upstream users’ behavior.  
Finally, during the first round, variability did not appear to be
significant. However, the significant effect of LHNorNHL x
NoVar seems to indicate that decisions in round 1 differed because
of unmeasured effects pertaining to group composition in the
different sequences explored. On the other hand, in the models
representing rounds 2-15 (Table 4), high environmental variability
seemed to contribute to reduced investments, compared with the
baseline scenario of no variability and the NLH sequence. High
variability, when the variability sequence was LHNorNHL, had
a significant impact on investments, and this may have led,
indirectly, to reduced extractions. The significant effect of high
variability was also confirmed by the fact that LHNorNHL x
HighVar was significantly different than LHNorNHL x NoVar
and LHNorNHL x LowVar (p < 0.05 in both cases). The test
results hold true for all specifications presented in Table 4. This
finding is in line with previous findings on the effect of
environmental variability on collective action (Walker and
Gardner 1992, Biel and Gärling 1995, Anderies et al. 2013).  
The description of the results holds at the group level (Table 5)
with some interesting differences. Although upstream users ’
behavior is always an important factor determining the level of
group investment, average group risk scores and average trust are
not significant within the first round but become mostly
significant in subsequent rounds. The effect of averaged group
risk and trust scores is different than the individual trust and risk
effect. Group propensity for risk and trust seem to be important
at the aggregate level, but their effect is dampened at the individual
level.  
The use of standardized coefficients, i.e., betas, allowed us to
compare the effects of the different variables on investment at the
group and individual levels. We started by analyzing the
magnitude of the significant coefficients for the individual-level
models (Table 4). In round 1, (model 1), trust was the most
important factor positively affecting investment, whereas being
positioned at the tail end of the group was, from the beginning
of the game, the most important factor negatively affecting
investment. The results of the first round of the experiment
confirm the importance of trust in affecting collective action,
especially in one-shot games (Biel and Garling 1995). Being
positioned at the tail end had a definite effect on extraction
expectation, which sensibly lowered investment into the common-
pool resource for individuals occupying these positions. This
latter result is also in line with previous experimental studies
(Janssen et al. 2012, Cardenas et al. 2013). In rounds 2-15, the
role of trust was supplanted by ESR, which took on an important
role in positively affecting investment levels. Meanwhile,
positioning was still the most important factor negatively
impacting collective action. Once again, the results of our
individual-level models are in line with previous literature, in
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Table 6. Results for the model reported in equation 5 with
standardized coefficients.
 
Dep
Variables
Indep Variables R1 NG ESR ALL
Round 1 Rounds 2-15
INV
Position B 0.053 -0.012 -0.054*** -0.014
(0.136) (0.034) (0.033) (0.031)
Position C -0.047 -0.005 -0.064*** -0.007
(0.139) (0.036) (0.037) (0.033)
Position D -0.017 -0.055*** -0.186*** -0.060***
(0.184) (0.039) (0.038) (0.036)
Position E -0.268*** -0.086*** -0.271*** -0.088***
(0.145) (0.044) (0.045) (0.044)
NLH x LowVar -0.013 0.018 0.004
(0.064) (0.052) (0.061)
NLH x HighVar 0.042 0.048* 0.042
(0.074) (0.063) (0.071)
LHNorNHL x NoVar -0.338*** -0.067** -0.184*** -0.054*
(0.096) (0.066) (0.057) (0.065)
LHNorNHL x LowVar -0.058 -0.077** -0.113*** -0.048*
(0.111) (0.065) (0.057) (0.062)
LHNorNHL x HighVar -0.087*** -0.215*** -0.077**
(0.057) (0.052) (0.055)
Normalized Risk Scores 0.102** 0.007 0.025 -0.007
(0.206) (0.105) (0.093) (0.097)
Trust 0.378*** -0.010 0.036** -0.006
(0.077) (0.041) (0.040) (0.039)
UUB NG 2.333** 2.501
(0.078) (5.330)
UUB ESR -0.166*** 0.036
(0.051) (0.326)
Extraction (t-1) 2.584*** 0.371*** 2.667***
(0.046) (0.020) (0.055)
Round -0.066** -0.100*** -0.064**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Constant -0.560** 0.330*** 0.641*** 0.352***
(0.152) (0.089) (0.082) (0.080)
EXT
Investment -0.556*** 0.258*** 0.760*** 0.116***
(0.174) (0.021) (0.085) (0.021)
Position B -0.048 -0.075*** 0.035 -0.015
(0.192) (0.040) (0.046) (0.036)
Position C -0.035 -0.046* 0.091*** 0.012
(0.139) (0.045) (0.049) (0.041)
Position D -0.287*** -0.126*** 0.124*** -0.041*
(0.222) (0.043) (0.063) (0.041)
Position E -0.525*** -0.162*** 0.156*** -0.073***
(0.165) (0.043) (0.076) (0.041)
Trustworthiness 0.108*** -0.015 -0.045** -0.025
(0.227) (0.096) (0.101) (0.089)
Medium Rainfall 0.317*** 0.316*** 0.314***
(0.025) (0.027) (0.022)
High Rainfall 0.587*** 0.440*** 0.482*** 0.458***
(0.176) (0.037) (0.038) (0.033)
UUB NG -0.463** -0.289
(0.015) (0.641)
UUB ESR 0.886*** 0.621
(0.167) (5.616)
Round 0.006 -0.015 -0.035**
(con'd)
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003)
Constant 0.707*** 0.045 -0.443** 0.102
(0.186) (0.106) (0.147) (0.097)
UUB
Netgain t-1 -0.979** -0.959
(4.146) (4.167)
Netgain t-2 -0.035* -0.037
(0.167) (0.155)
ESR t-1 0.194*** 0.184
(0.046) (0.187)
ESR t-1 0.334*** 0.388
(0.056) (0.397)
Model Statistics
N 80.000 1040.000 990.000 990.000
Chi2 8.617 270.074 797.978 241.653
Df(deg Freedom) 9.000 26.000 26.000 26.000
P-value 0.473 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: * = significant at the 95% level, ** = significant at the 99% level, and
*** = significant at the 99.9% level. Bootstrapped standard errors are in
parentheses. All models are controlled for effects between and within
groups. Position is compared with position A. Sequence and Variability are
compared with Sequence NLH x No Variability. Rainfall is compared with
low rainfall. LHN, low, high, and no variability; NHL, no, high, and low
variability; NLH, no, low, and high variability; NG, net gain; ESR, equal-
share ratio; UUB, upstream users’ behavior.
which extraction inequality is seen as the main factor driving
reduced investments in the common-pool resource (Janssen et
al. 2012, Cardenas et al. 2013).  
At the group level in round 1 (Table 5), the only significant
variable affecting investments was the change in variability
sequence. In rounds 2-15 the most important negative effect was
extraction inequality. The greater the extraction inequality, the
lower the group investment level. This result, once again,
confirms previous findings on the importance of extraction
inequality and its effect on collective action. Variability at the
group level had an interesting double effect. On the one hand,
when the variability sequence was the baseline NLH order, it
had a positive effect on investment. However, in all other cases,
variability reduced the investment level. The effect of high
variability was significantly different from low and no variability
when the sequence was LHNorNHL (Wald test p < 0.001),
confirming the results above for all models presented in Tables
4 and 5. However, when the sequence was no, low, and high
variability (NLH), there was no difference between low and high
variability, and the effect on investment was positive.
Unfortunately, we have no theoretical explanation for why this
was the case. We can only speculate that the positive effect from
variability might have been generated by an optimism that newly
introduced variability following the no-variability phase might
lead to better extraction opportunities. Finally, at the group
level, risk aversion had a prominent role in positively affecting
the investment level. A higher will to take risks within a group
led to higher average group investment. This result is also in line
with previous research on the effect of risk aversion on
investment in variable conditions.
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Assessing results robustness: a different statistical approach
The differences between round 1 and rounds 2-15 point to the
importance of recognizing the simultaneous effects that investment
and extraction decisions can have on each other over time. To assess
such effects, we modeled the simultaneous causality between
investment and extraction via equation 5 and equation 6. This
statistical model is also depicted in Figure 7.
Fig. 7. Diagrammatic representation of the statistical model
represented in equation 5. Arrows represent the direction of
dependencies as modeled. Arrows on the error terms indicate
correction for autocorrelation and correlation between them.
(5)
 
where 
(6)
 
and investment (Inv) and extraction (Ext ) depend on:  
. a vector of dummy characteristics (DChar), representing
position, sequence-variability interaction, and rainfall; 
. a vector of personal characteristics (Char) such as trust,
trustworthiness, and risk aversion; and 
. the effect from observed upstream users’ behavior (Uub;
equation 6). 
The effect of upstream users’ behavior is dependent on the observed
behavior (Obs) given by simple indicators such as ESR (as per
equation 1) and net gain (as per equation 2). Gi is a variable that
controls for between-group variations. Finally εi,t, ui,t and vi,t 
represent the error terms for each of the equations.  
To assess the importance of the explanatory variables, we report
the standardized coefficients stemming from the model described
above (Table 6) and the standardized total effects to allow for
comparison between variables (strength of effects; Table 7).
Although the standard coefficients traditionally reported in
statistical models take only direct effects into account, the total
effects presented here include the direct and indirect effects of an
explanatory variable on the dependent variable. In our model as
shown in Figure 7, trust directly affected investments; however,
trust could also affect extraction decisions indirectly via the
previously made investment decision. Likewise, rainfall impacted
extraction at t; however, it could also have an indirect effect on
investment at t+1.  
To assess model fit, we report the overall R² and goodness-of-fit
test (or Χ² test). The information and results given by the system
represented in equation 5 serve as an important robustness check
of the models used in equations 3 and 4. Details for the model
estimation in equation 5 and Figure 7 are provided in Appendix
1 (Statistical Model). Tables 6 and 7 report the results for equation
5 under three different specifications. Changes in the model
specification are targeted toward the measure of the observed
behavior variables: net gain, equal-share ratio, and both net gain
and ESR together. We report results for the first round (model 1)
separately to assess whether trust, risk aversion, and variability
have a different effect at the beginning of the experiment than in
subsequent rounds.  
Tables 6 and 7 confirm the results for investments; however, they
also account for another layer of complexity that exists in these
kinds of experiments: they explicitly assess the interdependencies
between investment and extraction over time, given a set of
independent variables. It is notable that in round one there was
no positive relationship between investment and extraction. A
plausible explanation lies in the nature of the resource in the
experiment. In a situation where the group investment does not
reach a specific threshold (as reported in Table 2), investment does
not lead to the generation of a resource, and consequently, the
extraction level will be zero. If  this happens, the first round sets
in motion a negative path toward purely selfish behavior (i.e., zero
investments). Another plausible explanation is that, at least in
round one, individuals are more prone to be generous because the
behavior of other group members cannot be known.  
The results of round one, however, were not duplicated in
subsequent rounds. As a result, no matter what is used to proxy
observed behavior, we can confidently affirm that trust loses its
importance, transferring causal importance to the observed
actions of the upstream users. This latter result is the logical
consequence of repeated interactions between individuals. The
amount invested is always highly significant and positively related
to the amount extracted, and the amount extracted in a previous
round is always highly significant and positively related to the
amount invested in the subsequent round. This relationship is not
surprising, and it highlights the importance of the behavioral
interdependencies involved in sequential investment-extraction
decisions.  
We need to acknowledge that the more complex the experiment,
the more complex the analysis will be. All statistical estimation is
prone to bias and efficiency issues; however, the multiple tools
used here allow us to be confident in our analysis and in the
robustness of our results.
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Table 7. Results for the model reported in equation 5 at the individual level. Coefficients represent the total effect of variables of interest
(direct and indirect effects).
 
Variable R1 NG ESR All
Round 1 Rounds 2-15
inv ext inv Ext inv ext inv Ext
Extraction(t-1)+e 2.584*** 0.666*** 0.371*** 0.282*** 2.667*** 0.310***
(0.046) (0.055) (0.020) (0.028) (0.055) (0.055)
Investment -0.556*** 0.258*** 0.760*** 0.116***
(0.174) (0.021) (0.085) (0.021)
Position B 0.053 -0.078 -0.012 -0.079*** -0.054*** -0.006 -0.014 -0.017
(0.136) (0.138) (0.034) (0.040) (0.033) (0.041) (0.031) (0.036)
Position C -0.047 -0.009 -0.005 -0.048* -0.064*** 0.042* -0.007 0.011
(0.136) (0.110) (0.036) (0.046) (0.037) (0.047) (0.033) (0.042)
Position D -0.017 -0.277*** -0.055*** -0.140*** -0.186*** -0.018 -0.060*** -0.048**
(0.184) (0.141) (0.039) (0.043) (0.038) (0.045) (0.036) (0.042)
Position E -0.268*** -0.376*** -0.086*** -0.184*** -0.271*** -0.050** -0.088*** -0.083***
(0.145) (0.133) (0.044) (0.042) (0.045) (0.046) (0.044) (0.041)
NLH x LowVar+e -0.013 -0.003 0.018 0.014 0.004 0.001
(0.064) (0.016) (0.052) (0.042) (0.061) (0.007)
NLH x HighVar+e 0.042 0.011 0.048* 0.036* 0.042 0.005
(0.074) (0.019) (0.063) (0.049) (0.071) (0.009)
LHNorNHL x NoVar+e -0.338*** 0.188*** -0.067** -0.017 -0.184*** -0.140*** -0.054* -0.006
(0.096) (0.125) (0.066) (0.017) (0.057) (0.064) (0.065) (0.009)
LHNorNHL x LowVar+e -0.058 0.032 -0.077** -0.020** -0.113*** -0.086*** -0.048* -0.006
(0.111) (0.094) (0.065) (0.016) (0.057) (0.056) (0.062) (0.008)
LHNorNHL x HighVar+e -0.087*** -0.022** -0.215*** -0.163*** -0.077** -0.009**
(0.057) (0.015) (0.052) (0.055) (0.055) (0.008)
Medium Rainfall 0.317*** 0.316*** 0.314***
(0.025) (0.027) (0.022)
High Rainfall 0.587*** 0.440*** 0.482*** 0.458***
(0.176) (0.037) (0.038) (0.033)
Normalized Risk Scores+e 0.102** -0.057** 0.007 0.002 0.025 0.019 -0.007 -0.001
(0.206) (0.149) (0.105) (0.026) (0.093) (0.076) (0.097) (0.012)
Trust+e 0.378*** -0.210*** -0.010 -0.003 0.036** 0.027** -0.006 -0.001
(0.077) (0.129) (0.041) (0.010) (0.040) (0.030) (0.039) (0.005)
Trustworthiness 0.108** -0.015 -0.045** -0.025
(0.227) (0.096) (0.101) (0.089)
Round -0.066** -0.011 -0.100*** -0.091*** -0.064** -0.042**
(0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
UUB NG 2.333** 0.138* 2.501 0.002
(0.078) (0.005) (5.330) (0.018)
UUB ESR -0.166*** 0.760*** 0.036 0.625
(0.051) (0.144) (0.326) (5.654)
Netgain(t-1)++ -2.283*** -0.135** -2.399*** -0.002
(0.047) (0.051) (0.055) (0.046)
Netgain(t-2)++ -0.081*** -0.005* -0.091*** 0.000
(0.018) (0.002) (0.017) (0.002)
ESR(t-1)++ -0.032*** 0.148*** 0.007 0.115***
(0.009) (0.027) (0.006) (0.026)
ESR(t-2)++ -0.055*** 0.254*** 0.014 0.242***
(0.012) (0.025) (0.012) (0.023)
N 80 1040 990 990
chi2 0.473 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2overall 0.507 0.999 0.786 0.999
Discrepancy 0.108 0.260 0.806 0.244
Note: * = significant at the 95% level, ** = significant at the 99% level, and *** = significant at the 99.9% level. Bootstrapped standard errors are in
parentheses. All coefficients are standardized and represent total effect. All models are controlled for effects between and within groups. +e =
Indirect effect of investment on extraction. ++ = Indirect effect because of upstream users’ behavior (UUB). Position is compared with position A.
Sequence and Variability are compared with Sequence NLH x No Variability. Rainfall is compared with low rainfall. LHN, low, high, and no
variability; NHL, no, high, and low variability; NLH, no, low, and high variability; NG, net gain; ESR, equal-share ratio.
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CONCLUSION
Many small-scale irrigation systems around the world face the
dual problems of how to collectively construct the needed
infrastructure for the common-pool resource and how to
effectively and equitably share that resource. Upstream farmers
possess privileged access to the water in the system, but they are
also dependent on the contributions of the downstream farmers
to build and maintain the infrastructure that carries the needed
water. Thus, an important challenge in managing common-pool
resources is how to ensure collective action so as to maintain the
resource at a sustainable level, while preventing individuals in
privileged positions from taking advantage of the general effort.
Collective action is especially challenging in systems that are
naturally prone to asymmetries because of heterogeneity caused
by biophysical contexts (Anderies et al. 2011). The complexity of
the coupled interactions between the ecological natural processes
(such as the risks posed by environmental conditions) and the
decisions of the resource users complicate matters further
(Anderies et al. 2004).  
We made a first attempt to disentangle the interplay between
variability, trust, upstream user behavior, and resource viability
via a simple asymmetric common-pool resource game. The
experiment performed could be analyzed in many different ways.
The richness of the data is a benefit, but this richness can also be
daunting when it comes to understanding the dynamics of the
system. Given the complexity rising from the interplay of path
dependency, personal characteristics, and variability, we need to
caution against generalizing experiments performed in a
laboratory setting. Still, we believe that our experiment allows us
to draw some preliminary conclusions about the relationship
between environmental variability and the feedback loop between
upstream user behavior and reciprocity-type responses.  
Effects from reactions to upstream users’ behavior take
precedence over initial personal characteristics and variability in
the resource. This effect, especially for investments, is clear and
secondary only to the positional asymmetry effect. This result
confirms, even in absence of communication, the outcomes
presented by Anderies et al. (2013). The complexity of the
investment extraction cycle is, however, not so easy to disentangle.
Investment and extraction decisions continuously influence each
other, whether an individual is more concerned about gains (net
gains) or equity (ESR), or if  there is extraction inequality
(extraction gini coefficient). The strength of path dependency and
the importance of upstream users’ behavior in the irrigation
context are also confirmed by the difference exhibited between
the first and subsequent rounds of the game. As expected, trust
at the individual level is a prominent factor, affecting decisions
on investment levels to maintain and generate the resource;
however, it quickly gives way to the importance of observed
behavior. The importance of behavioral characteristics and
interplay between observed environmental and personal
characteristics is also confirmed by the results presented in Baggio
and Janssen (2013). What other individuals do greatly affects one’s
own decisions. Where individuals are located in the system is a
highly significant factor in their willingness to contribute, and the
tail enders are highly dependent on the head enders to maintain
share equality.  
From the experiments performed, we can affirm that (1) upstream
users’ behavior is by far the most important variable in
determining the outcome of collective action; (2) environmental
variability (i.e. risk level in investing in the resource) has little
effect on individual investment and extraction levels; and (3) the
action-reaction feedback is fundamental in determining the
success or failure of communities, at least within the limits of our
study. Our results confirm the basic dynamics of Ostrom’s
behavioral model of collective action (Ostrom 1998).
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/7772
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Supplementary Figures: 
 
Figure S1: Investment per group per position. Each group is preceded by the treatment label (NLH = no, low and high Variability, 
NHL = no, high and low Variability; LHN = low, high and no Variability) 
 
 Figure S2: Extraction per group per position. Each group is preceded by the treatment label (NLH = no, low and high Variability, 
NHL = no, high and low Variability; LHN = low, high and no Variability) 
 
  
Correlogram between variables 
Table S1: Correlogram for variables at the individual level (only continuous variables) 
             |      inv      ext    trust    worth     risk  eqshare  netgain     
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------- 
         inv |   1.0000 
         ext |   0.3577   1.0000 
       trust |   0.0115  -0.1572   1.0000 
       worth |   0.1468   0.1072   0.2786   1.0000 
        risk |  -0.0555  -0.0357  -0.0847  -0.1447   1.0000 
     eqshare |   0.2383   0.6511  -0.2034   0.1055   0.0150   1.0000 
     netgain |  -0.2081   0.8390  -0.1713   0.0267  -0.0051   0.5431   1.0000 
       
 
 Table S2: Correlogram for variables at the group level (only continuous variables) 
             |   avginv   avgext avgtrust avgworth  avgrisk  extgini  invgini     
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------- 
      avginv |   1.0000 
      avgext |   0.7289   1.0000 
    avgtrust |   0.0916   0.0048   1.0000 
    avgworth |   0.0755   0.0419   0.1795   1.0000 
     avgrisk |   0.3800   0.3073   0.0265   0.4214   1.0000 
     extgini |  -0.3270  -0.3395   0.1409  -0.0425   0.0193   1.0000 
     invgini |  -0.8733  -0.6693   0.0300  -0.0512  -0.3220   0.3901   1.0000 
 
  
Statistical Model 
Estimating a model that assesses feedbacks between investments and extractions 
 
The primary dependent variable in our statistical model, Investment, represents cooperation and level of 
collective action. Investment levels over time have been estimated explicitly addressing inter-temporal error 
term correlation and correlation of error terms present in the system depicted in eq 5 (i.e. correlation between
,i t  
and 
,i t ). Correcting for correlation between error terms follows empirical methodology used in economics (see 
for example Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005, Baggio and Papyrakis 2010).  Correcting for correlation 
between error terms (in the manner proposed by Zellner (1962)), increases the efficiency of the estimated 
coefficients and decreases our system’s sensitivity to specification errors.  
 
Among other factors, Investment and Extraction decisions are a result of observed behavior measures such as 
Net Gain and Equal Share Ratio. The persistence of investment and extraction levels and consequentially, the 
metrics used for upstream user behavior (see Figures S1 and S2) bias our estimates. This bias is caused by the 
correlation between independent variables within the system and the actual system error terms (i.e. 
endogeneity). To avoid that bias we instrumented observed behavior (Net Gain, ESR) by using them as 
explanatory variables on upstream users’ behavior (Uub). In other words, the observation variable is considered 
a latent variable that is a linear function of a combination of investment and extractions (i.e., Net Gain, ESR, 
Gini coefficient of investment or extraction). Instrumenting the observed behavior variable and using its lags 
avoids these error-variable correlation problems. In other words, we are making sure that Uub is not correlated 
with the systems’ error terms. Therefore, we built a system of equations in which we took into account any 
correlation between error terms and corrected for autocorrelation.  
 
To increase the robustness of our estimates we estimated the model in eq. 5 using the Asymptotically 
Distribution Free method (ADF) (Browne, 1984), a General Methods of Moments estimator (GMM). ADF (and 
GMM) allow estimates to be consistent and efficient when no distributional assumptions are made (i.e., when 
data are not jointly normal) (Hansen 1982). Using ADF increases robustness against correlation between the 
equation error terms and the explanatory variables used in the model--a condition that leads to endogeneity. 
However, ADF estimation requires, in general, large samples, because with small samples and complex models, 
ADF may lead to misleading results and achieving model convergence is problematic at best. In order to 
increase the reliability of our estimates and diminish convergence issues, we bootstraped our estimates and 
report bootstrapped standard errors over 500 repetitions.  
 
Collinearity – possible problem 
 
We checked variables for collinearity, finding a possible problem between average investment and investment 
Gini coefficient as hinted by the correlogram on averages. However, the two variables do not appear directly in 
the same equation, as investment Gini coefficient is used as an instrument and lagged.  
 
Total Effects 
The total effect is calculated summing the direct and indirect effect of an explanatory variable on the dependent 
variable. For example, if we follow Figure 7, trust affects investments directly, however, trust also affects 
extractions at time t, albeit indirectly through investment. Table 5, S3, S4 and S5 all report standardized total 
effects for the variables of interest. The use of standardized coefficients allows us to compare the effect of the 
different variables on investment and extractions even if variables are measured on different scales. 
Table S2 reports total effect for the system estimated at the group level. Table S4 and S5 are a summary of 
effects for the model estimated at round 1 and the model estimated with the different specifications: with Net 
Gain, with Equal Share Ratio, and with both for the individual level; and investment Gini coefficient, Extraction 
Gini coefficient and both for the group level. Tables S4 and S5 report standardized total effect for the first 
Round and the average, minimum and maximum standardized total effects for the NG, ESR and All (and Inv, 
Ext models for the group level) models as in Table 5 and S3. Table S4 and S5 also report how many times (in 
proportion) a variable was deemed significant in the ESR, NG and All models (or Inv, Ext and All for the group 
models), and if their effect is consistent (i.e., the fraction of times a variable was positive or negative, depending 
on the slight changes in the model specification). N represents the number of times a specific explanatory 
variable was included in the three different model specification (individual and group level). 
References for Statistical Model Estimation and Justification: 
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Table S3. Results for the Model reported in eq. 3 at the group level. 
Variable 
R1 Inv Ext All 
avginv avgext avginv avgext avginv avgext avginv avgext 
Avg Extractiont-1+e     0.241* 0.198* 0.431* 0.289* 0.195* 0.156* 
      (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.013) (0.017) (0.015) 
Avg Investment   0.563  0.819*   0.671*  0.800* 
    (0.501)  (0.036)   (0.013)  (0.033) 
Low Variability+e 0.570* 0.321 0.092* 0.076* 0.034 0.023 0.043* 0.035* 
  (0.106) (0.378) (0.043) (0.041) (0.040) (0.029) (0.038) (0.033) 
High Variability+e     0.065* 0.053* 0.099* 0.067* 0.089* 0.071* 
      (0.046) (0.042) (0.039) (0.028) (0.043) (0.039) 
Normal Rainfall      0.434*   0.446*  0.439* 
       (0.011)   (0.009)  (0.011) 
High Rainfall   0.478  0.748*   0.754*  0.750* 
    (0.659)  (0.022)   (0.022)  (0.021) 
Treatment+e -0.706* -0.398 -0.093* -0.076* -0.215* -0.144* -0.108* -0.086* 
  (0.075) (0.411) (0.028) (0.024) (0.025) (0.017) (0.029) (0.024) 
Avg Normalized Risk Scores+e -0.032* -0.018 0.145* 0.118* 0.307* 0.206* 0.219* 0.175* 
  (0.001) (0.509) (0.687) (0.640) (0.689) (0.522) (0.694) (0.744) 
Avg Trust+e -0.223* -0.125 0.074* 0.061* 0.066* 0.044* 0.087* 0.069* 
  (0.007) (1.266) (0.225) (0.193) (0.180) (0.132) (0.200) (0.176) 
Avg Trustworthiness   -0.062  0.007   0.022*  0.001 
    (1.916)  (0.115)   (0.103)  (0.116) 
Round     -0.018 -0.010 -0.111* -0.080* -0.061* -0.047* 
      (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Upstream Users Behavior Inv     -0.583* -0.398*     0.642 0.387 
      (0.059) (0.075) 0.742*   (2.443) (1.533) 
Upstream Users Behavior Ext       (0.155) 0.869* 0.239 0.321 
          (0.307) (7.353) (10.268) 
Gini Investmentt-1++     -0.362* 0.620*     -0.469* -0.283* 
      (0.165) (0.349)     (0.107) (0.114) 
Gini Investmentt-2++     -0.194* 0.332*        
      (0.158) (0.323)        
Gini Extractiont-1++       0.038* 0.044* -0.127* -0.171* 
        (0.066) (0.083) (0.055) (0.055) 
Gini Extractiont-2++       -0.243* -0.284*    
          (0.079) (0.081     
N 80 1040 1040 1120 
Chi2 p-value  n.a. 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Overall R2 0.680 0.999 0.999 0.967 
Discrepancy 0.000 0.250 0.398 0.264 
 
Note: * = significant at the 95% level, bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis. All coefficients are 
standardized and represent total effect. +e = Indirect effect due to Investment on Extraction ++ = Indirect effect 
due to Observed behavior. Position is compared to Position A, Treatment is comparing LHN and NHL to NLH. 
Rainfall is compared to low rainfall and Variability to no Variability. 
 Table S4: Summary for system coefficients at the Individual Level 
  Investment Extraction 
Variable R1 avg min max Sign+ Sign- Sig N R1 avg min max Sign+ Sign- Sig N 
Extraction(t-1)+e   1.874 0.371 2.667 1.000 0.000 1.000 3  0.378 0.116 0.760 1.000 0.000 1.000 3 
Investment           -0.556 0.419 0.282 0.666 1.000 0.000 1.000 3 
Position B 0.053 -0.027 -0.054 -0.012 0.000 1.000 0.333 3 -0.078 -0.034 -0.079 -0.006 0.000 1.000 0.333 3 
Position C -0.047 -0.025 -0.064 -0.005 0.000 1.000 0.333 3 -0.009 0.002 -0.048 0.042 0.667 0.333 0.667 3 
Position D -0.017 -0.100 -0.186 -0.055 0.000 1.000 1.000 3 -0.277 -0.069 -0.140 -0.018 0.000 1.000 0.667 3 
Position E -0.268 -0.148 -0.271 -0.086 0.000 1.000 1.000 3 -0.376 -0.106 -0.184 -0.050 0.000 1.000 1.000 3 
NLH*LowVar+e   0.044 0.042 0.048 1.000 0.000 0.333 3  0.017 0.005 0.036 0.667 0.000 0.333 3 
NLH*HighVar+e   0.003 -0.013 0.018 0.667 0.333 0.000 3  0.004 -0.003 0.014 0.333 0.333 0.000 3 
LHNorNHL*NoVar+e   -0.126 -0.215 -0.077 0.000 1.000 1.000 3  -0.065 -0.163 -0.009 0.000 1.000 1.000 3 
LHNorNHL*LowVar+e -0.058 -0.079 -0.113 -0.048 0.000 1.000 1.000 3 0.032 -0.037 -0.086 -0.006 0.000 1.000 0.667 3 
LHNorNHL*HighVar+e -0.338 -0.102 -0.184 -0.054 0.000 1.000 1.000 3 0.188 -0.054 -0.140 -0.006 0.000 1.000 0.667 3 
Normal Rainfall            0.316 0.314 0.317 1.000 0.000 1.000 3 
High Rainfall           0.587 0.460 0.440 0.482 1.000 0.000 1.000 3 
Normalized Risk Scores+e 0.102 0.008 -0.007 0.025 0.333 0.333 0.000 3 -0.057 0.007 -0.001 0.019 0.667 0.333 0.000 3 
Trust+e 0.378 0.007 -0.010 0.036 0.333 0.333 0.333 3 -0.210 0.008 -0.003 0.027 0.333 0.667 0.333 3 
Trustworthiness           0.108 -0.028 -0.045 -0.015 0.000 0.667 0.333 3 
Round   0.723 -0.100 2.333 0.333 0.667 1.000 3  -0.048 -0.091 -0.011 0.000 0.667 0.667 3 
UUB NG   -0.045 -0.166 0.036 0.333 0.333 0.333 3  0.693 0.625 0.760 1.000 0.000 0.500 2 
UUB ESR   1.218 -0.066 2.501 0.500 0.500 0.500 2  0.070 0.002 0.138 0.500 0.000 0.500 2 
Netgain(t-1)++   -2.341 -2.399 -2.283 0.000 0.500 1.000 2  -0.069 -0.135 -0.002 0.000 1.000 0.500 2 
Netgain(t-2)++   -0.086 -0.091 -0.081 0.000 0.500 1.000 2  -0.003 -0.005 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.500 2 
ESR(t-1)++   -0.013 -0.032 0.007 0.500 0.500 0.500 2  0.132 0.115 0.148 1.000 0.000 1.000 2 
ESR(t-2)++   -0.021 -0.055 0.014 0.500 0.500 0.500 2   0.248 0.242 0.254 1.000 0.000 1.000 2 
Note: R1 = effects on round 1. ++ = effects given indirectly due to the Observation variable. +e = Indirect effect on extraction, but direct on 
investment. Avg, min, max = average, minimum and maximum coefficient estimated (exclude R1 estimates). Sign + and Sign – indicate the fraction 
of times that the coefficient was positive or negative. Sig = fraction of times a coefficient was significant. N = number of models in which a variable 
was estimated 
 
   
   
  
Table S5: Summary for system coefficients at the Group Level 
Variable 
Investment Extraction 
R1 avg min max sign + sign - sig N R1 avg min max sign + sign  - sig N 
Avg Extraction t-1+e   0.289 0.195 0.431 1.000 0.000 1.000 3  0.214 0.156 0.289 1.000 0.000 1.000 3 
Avg Investment           0.563 0.763 0.671 0.819 1.000 0.000 1.000 3 
Low Variability+e 0.570 0.057 0.034 0.092 1.000 0.000 0.667 3 0.321 0.044 0.023 0.076 1.000 0.000 0.667 3 
High Variability+e   0.084 0.065 0.099 1.000 0.000 1.000 3  0.064 0.053 0.071 1.000 0.000 1.000 3 
Normal Rainfall            0.440 0.434 0.446 1.000 0.000 1.000 3 
High Rainfall           0.478 0.751 0.748 0.754 1.000 0.000 1.000 3 
Treatment+e -0.706 -0.139 -0.215 -0.093 0.000 1.000 1.000 3 -0.398 -0.102 -0.144 -0.076 0.000 1.000 1.000 3 
Avg Normalized Risk Scores+e -0.032 0.224 0.145 0.307 1.000 0.000 1.000 3 -0.018 0.167 0.118 0.206 1.000 0.000 1.000 3 
Avg Trust+e -0.223 0.075 0.066 0.087 1.000 0.000 1.000 3 -0.125 0.058 0.044 0.069 1.000 0.000 1.000 3 
Avg Trustworthiness           -0.062 0.010 0.001 0.022 1.000 0.000 0.333 3 
Round   -0.063 -0.111 -0.018 0.000 1.000 0.667 3  -0.045 -0.080 -0.010 0.000 1.000 0.667 3 
Upstream users behavior Ext   0.197 0.155 0.239 1.000 0.000 0.000 2  0.595 0.321 0.869 1.000 0.000 0.500 2 
Upstream users behavior Inv   0.029 -0.583 0.642 0.500 0.500 0.500 2  -0.005 -0.398 0.387 0.500 0.500 0.500 2 
Gini Extractiont-1++   -0.045 -0.127 0.038 0.500 0.500 1.000 2  -0.063 -0.171 0.044 0.500 0.500 1.000 2 
Gini Extractiont-2++   -0.243 -0.243 -0.243 0.000 1.000 1.000 1  -0.284 -0.284 -0.284 0.000 1.000 1.000 1 
Gini Investmentt-1++   -0.415 -0.469 -0.362 0.000 1.000 1.000 2  0.168 -0.283 0.620 0.500 0.500 1.000 2 
Gini Investmentt-2++   -0.194 -0.194 -0.194 0.000 1.000 1.000 1   0.332 0.332 0.332 1.000 0.000 1.000 1 
Note: ++ = effects given indirectly due to the Observation variable. +e = Indirect effect on extraction, but direct on investment. Avg, min, max = 
average, minimum and maximum coefficient estimated. Sig + and Sig – indicate the fraction of times that the coefficient was positive or negative. 
Sig = fraction of times a coefficient was significant. N = number of models in which a variable was estimated. 
 
Experiment Instructions and Forms 
 
Italic: instructions for the experimenters 
Normal: instructions read out loud for the participants 
 
When people show up they sign consent form. Participants are seated in groups of 5, their positions 
determined randomly. When people are seated they are requested to complete the two exercise forms. 
 
Welcome to the experiment. We will complete a number of exercises. You will be rewarded by cash payments 
at the end of the experiment based on the decisions you have made. Before we begin I ask you to turn off 
your mobile phones and other mobile devices so we will not be disturbed during the experiment. 
 
We will now give you two exercises which you are asked to fill out. Please read the instructions carefully since 
your decisions will affect how much money you can earn. If you have questions raise your hand and we will 
address your question. 
 
Exercise 1. Risk aversion 
 
Exercise 2. Trust games 
 
When the forms are collected, we will proceed to the irrigation experiment 
 
 
Exercise 1 
 
This exercise sheet lists ten decisions. Each decision is a paired choice between "Option A" and "Option B." 
You will make ten choices and record these in the final column, but only one of these choices will be used in 
the end to determine your earnings. Before you start making your ten choices, please let me explain how 
these choices will affect your earnings for this part of the experiment. 
 
We will use a ten-sided die to determine the payoffs; the faces are numbered from 1 to 10. After you have 
made all of your choices, we will throw this die twice, once to select one of the ten decisions to be used, and a 
second time to determine what your payoff is for the option you chose, A or B, for the particular decision 
selected. Even though you will make ten decisions, only one of these will end up affecting your earnings, but 
you will not know in advance which decision will be used. Obviously, each decision has an equal chance of 
being used in the end. 
 
Now, please look at Decision 1 at the top. Option A pays $2.00 if the throw of the ten sided die is 1 and it pays 
$1.60 if the throw is 2-10. Option B yields $3.85 if the throw of the die is 1, and it pays $0.10 if the throw is 2-
10. The other Decisions are similar, except that as you move down the table, the chances of the higher payoff 
for each option increase. In fact, for Decision 10 in the bottom row, the die will not be needed since each 
option always pays the highest payoff, so your choice here is between $2.00 or $3.85. 
 
To summarize, you will make ten choices: for each decision row you have to choose between Option A or 
Option B. You may choose A for some decision rows and B for other rows, and you may change your decisions 
and make them in any order. When you are finished, we will collect the forms. When we pay you your 
earnings at the end of today’s exercises, we will throw the ten-sided die to select which of the ten Decisions 
will be used, and a second time to determine your money earnings for the Option you chose for that Decision. 
Earnings for this choice will be added to your other earnings, and you will be paid all earnings in cash. 
 
So now please fill in each of the empty boxes on the right side of the record sheet. You need to enter your 
choice, A or B, in each of these boxes. 
 
Are there any questions? Now you may begin making your choices. Please do not talk with anyone while we 
are doing this; raise your hand if you have a question. 
 
 
Die Option A Option B Your Choice  
(A or B) 
1 $2.00 – 1 
$1.60 - 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 
$3.85 – 1 
$0.10 – 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 
 
2 $2.00 – 1, 2 
$1.60 – 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 
$3.85 – 1, 2 
$0.10 – 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 
 
3 $2.00 – 1, 2, 3 
$1.60 – 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 
$3.85 – 1, 2, 3 
$0.10 – 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 
 
4 $2.00 – 1, 2, 3, 4 
$1.60 – 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 
$3.85 – 1, 2, 3, 4 
$0.10 – 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 
 
5 $2.00 – 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
$1.60 – 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 
$3.85 – 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 
$0.10 – 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 
 
6 $2.00 – 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
$1.60 – 7, 8, 9, 10 
$3.85 – 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 
$0.10 – 7, 8, 9, 10 
 
7 $2.00 – 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 
$1.60 – 8, 9, 10 
$3.85 – 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 
$0.10 – 8, 9, 10 
 
8 $2.00 – 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 
$1.60 – 9, 10 
$3.85 – 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 
$0.10 – 9, 10 
 
9 $2.00 – 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
$1.60 – 10 
$3.85 – 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 
$0.10 – 10 
 
10 $2.00 – 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 
 
$3.85 – 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10  
 
  
Exercise 2 
 
In this exercise you will be randomly matched with another person in this room, but you will not know who 
that person is.  That person will also not know who you are.  You must write down your decisions for the 
possibility if you are selected to be Player 1 in this exercise or if you are selected to be Player 2.   
 
The person randomly selected to be Player 1 has the following decision to make: You will receive 3 dollars and 
must decide how much to keep for yourself and how much to send to Player 2 in this room.  
 
The amount you send to Player 2 will be tripled and then given to Player 2.  Player 2 will decide how much to 
keep and how much to send back to you.  For example, if you, Player 1, send 0 dollars to player 2, 0 dollars will 
be sent to player 2 and you will keep 3 dollars for yourself.   However, if you choose to send 3 dollars to Player 
2, those 3 dollars will be multiplied into 9 dollars and sent to Player 2.  Player 2 would then decide how much 
to return to you. 
 
Player 2 has the following decision to make: You have to choose for each of the 4 possible cases, how much to 
keep for yourself and how much to send back to player 1. 
 
Please complete both tables for Player 1 AND for Player 2.  We will randomly select whether you are Player 1 
or Player 2 after we receive all these forms. 
 
Are there any questions?  If you have a question, raise your hand and I will try to answer it. 
 
Player 1: Please check ONE of the following allocations. 
Dollars kept by you Dollars send to other Received by other Check One Row 
$0 $3 (3x$3) = $9  
$1 $2 (3x$2) = $6  
$2 $1 (3x$1) = $3  
$3 $0 (3x$0) = $0  
 
Player 2: Please enter your choice for ALL of the following allocations: 
               (column 3 and 4 must add up to column 2) 
Sent by other Received from other Kept by you Send back to other 
$0 (3x$0) = $0 $0 $0 
$1 (3x$1) = $3   
$2 (3x$2) = $6   
$3 (3x$3) = $9   
 
  
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE IRRIGATION GAME 
 
Baseline Phase - No Variability 
 
This exercise is intended to recreate a situation in which people must make decisions about using water to 
irrigate land.  You have been selected to participate in a group of five individuals.  You will play several rounds, 
each of which is roughly equivalent to an agricultural year or irrigation season. 
 
In each round, you will have to make two decisions.  First, each of you will have to decide how much to 
contribute into a public fund to maintain the irrigation canal.  The sum of all the contributions to the fund will 
determine the quantity of water units that will be available to your group.  In the second decision, you will 
take turns extracting water units from the system.  Each unit you collect during the game is equivalent to 5 
cents.  For example, if you collect 200 units during the game, you will receive $10. 
 
We will now discuss the first decision in detail.  Each round, you will begin with 10 units to spend.  You have to 
decide how many of those units to contribute into the public fund and how many to keep for yourself.  You 
can think of this as the amount of labor you might invest into the maintenance of the irrigation system.  The 
amount of effort you may contribute is between 0 and 10 units.  You will enter your contribution quantity 
onto your Decision Form in Column A. 
 
We will write down your contribution decision and calculate the quantity of water units available to the group 
using the TABLE OF AVAILABLE WATER QUANTITY, which you have for reference.  This payoff table shows you 
how the available water quantity is calculated based upon the size of the public fund, from your contribution 
and those of the other 4 players in your group.   
 
Once we have recorded your contribution decisions and calculated the quantity of available water, we will 
write that quantity onto your Decision Form in Column B. 
 
So, for example, if everyone were to contribute 2 units to the public fund and kept 8 units for themselves, no 
water would be available to be distributed to the group.  As a result, everyone would end up with 8 units at 
the end of the round. 
 
In another example, if everyone were to invest 10 units into the public fund, 100 units of water would be 
available to be distributed to the group. 
 
Keep in mind that decisions are private, and everyone can decide how much they want to invest into the 
public fund.  
 
Once the total water quantity has been written onto your decision form, each individual in your group will 
take turns in deciding how much water to extract from the irrigation system.  In this experiment, everyone has 
the same size of land to be irrigated.  The amount of money that you will earn is directly dependent upon the 
amount of water you take from the system. 
 
After you signed in today, you drew a random card labeled with your group number and a letter, A, B, C, D, or 
E.  That card determined your position within your group. 
 
Your group will take turns in deciding how much water to take for irrigating their land.  These turns are 
determined by the letter of the card you received, which indicates your position in the irrigation system. 
 
This means that first, player A decides how much water to take and writes down that decision onto the 
Decision Form in Column C.  We will record that decision and subtract the taken water from the available 
water for player B.  We will write down the remaining available water quantity and show this number to 
player B so they can take their turn and decide how much water to take.  Each player takes their turn in this 
manner until player E has written down their decision. 
 
[example: The instructor shows what happens if first player A takes from the pool, then B, etc.] 
 
You may keep track of your earnings each round by filling in Columns D and E on your Decision Form.  Column 
D is the amount of units you kept for yourself instead of investing into the public fund.  Column E is your 
earnings for the round, which is the sum of the water you extracted plus the units you kept in the first 
decision. 
 
The next round begins with your decisions on the contributions to the public fund as in the previous round. 
 
It is very important to keep in mind that your decisions are absolutely individual.  This means that the numbers 
you write down on the forms are private and you must not show them or discuss them with the other 
members of the group. 
 
Are there any questions about this? [MONITOR: pause to resolve questions.] 
 
 
Remember that the units you earn depend on your own decisions, and they will become money at the end of 
this exercise. 
 
Keep in mind that from now on you are not allowed to talk unless I give you permission. 
 
We will have one practice round that will NOT count for your real earnings.  It is just an opportunity for you to 
familiarize yourself with the game. For this practice round, contribute 5 units into the public fund. 
 
We will now record your contribution decisions. 
 
Because everyone contributed 5 units, resulting in 25 units in the public fund, 40 units of water are available 
to the group. 
 
Now you will take turns in deciding how much water to extract from the system, beginning with player A. 
 
We will now start the actual experiment 
 
[continue with phase.] 
 
  
Low Variability Phase 
 
It is time to make one change to the game.  A new payoff table will be handed out.  Now, each round has the 
possibility of having a low, medium, or high level of rainfall, which will affect the amount of water that the 
irrigation system can produce.  Medium rainfall produces the normal amount of water in the irrigation system 
as was used in the previous rounds.  However, if a round has low rainfall, the amount of water generated for a 
given quantity of contributions will be lower than in a normal round.  If the round has high rainfall, the amount 
of water generated will be higher than normal. 
 
After all contributions into the public fund have recorded, the rainfall level will be announced. To determine 
whether each of the upcoming rounds will have low, medium, or high rainfall, a 6-sided die was rolled and 
recorded.  If the die was a 1, the round will be a low rainfall.  If the die was a 6, the round will be a high 
rainfall.  If the die was a 2 through 5, then the round will be medium rainfall.  Therefore, there is a 1 in 6 
chance for a round to be low rainfall, 1 in 6 chance for a round to be high rainfall, and a 4 in 6 chance for a 
normal month.  After the rainfall level is announced, the amount of water available to the group will be 
written onto your decision forms, and the second part of the round will continue. 
 
 
High Variability Phase 
It is time to make another change to the game.  We will continue to use the same payoff table as before, but 
this time, if the die was a 1 or 2, the round will be low rainfall.  If it was a 3 or 4, then the round will be 
medium rainfall, and if the die was a 5 or 6, the round will be high rainfall.  Each type of round has an equal 
chance of 1 in 3 in occurring.  After the rainfall level is announced, the amount of water available to the group 
will be written onto your decision forms, and the second part of the round will continue. 
  
Information provided to Participants: Table of Water availability 
 
Table of available water quantity 
Total units 
invested in 
the public 
fund by all 5 
players 
Water available 
Low Middle High 
0-10 0 0 0 
11-15 2 5 8 
16-20 8 20 32 
21-25 16 40 64 
26-30 24 60 96 
31-35 30 75 120 
36-40 34 85 136 
41-45 38 95 152 
46-50 40 100 160 
 
 
  
Participant Decision Form 
 
Player no:  
Capital letter: 
 Time:   
 Date:    
Round My Decisions   
 A B C D E 
 Contribution Water 
for group 
Amount  
extracted 
Amount 
kept = 
10-A 
Earnings: 
C+D 
Practice      
1      
2      
3      
4      
5      
6      
7      
8      
9      
10      
11      
12      
13      
14      
15      
16      
17      
18      
 
INDIVIDUAL SURVEY 
 
Participant ID:             
 
1. How old are you?       years 
 
2. Sex  Male  Female 
 
3. What is your major?: 
 
4. Year of study (chose one option) 
 1. Freshman  
 2. Sophomore 
 3. Junior 
 4. Senior 
 5. Graduate student 
 
5. How satisfied were you with the earnings during the exercises? 
 1. I was completely dissatisfied 
 2. I was not satisfied 
 3. I was somewhat satisfied 
 4. I was satisfied 
 5. I was very satisfied 
 
6. Did you understand the instructions of the exercises? 
 1. I did not understood anything 
 2. I did understand only a bit of the instructions 
 3. I did understood half of the instructions 
 4. I did understood most of the instructions 
 5. I did understood everything 
 
7. Have you ever voted in an election (including student governance elections)? 
 1. yes  
 2. No 
 
8. Global warming is a fact and is mostly caused by emissions from vehicles and industrial 
facilities. 
 1. I completely agree 
 2. I somewhat agree 
 3. I have no opinion 
 4. I somewhat disagree 
 5. I completely disagree 
 
SEE ALSO THE BACKSIDE 
9. The federal Government should manage the U.S. economy. 
 1. I completely agree 
 2. I somewhat agree 
 3. I have no opinion 
 4. I somewhat disagree 
 5. I completely disagree 
 
10. Tell me whether the first statement or the second statement comes closer to your own 
views — even if neither is exactly right.  
  1. Most people who want to get ahead can make it if they're willing to work hard 
OR 
 2. Hard work and determination are no guarantee of success for most people 
 
11. Tell me whether the first statement or the second statement comes closer to your own 
views — even if neither is exactly right.  
  1. The government should do more to help needy Americans, even if it means going 
deeper into debt 
OR 
 2. The government today can’t afford to do much more to help the needy 
 
12. Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend religious services 
 1. More than once a week 
 2. Once a week 
 3. Once or twice a month 
 4. A few times a year 
 5. Seldom 
 6. Never 
 
13. How important is religion in your life 
 1. Very important 
 2. Somewhat important 
 3. Not too important 
 4. Not at all important 
 5. Don’t know 
 
14. Please provide any comments on the experiment you have. 
 
 __________________________________________________________________ 
 __________________________________________________________________ 
  
 
 
 
